, must be considered an ethical issue. In the practice of animal experimentation, individuals are materially formed in their identity as experi mental living beings. These animals are often born with specific characteris tics suited to scientific experiments (see Linzey and Linzey, 2015) . The (Tannenbaum and Bennett, 2015 Smyth ( 1978) in Alternatives to Animal Experiments ( see Tannenbaum and Bennet, 2015 (see e.g., Tannenbaum and Bennett, 2015) ; but the core of the message remains in favor of animal experiments. Indeed, more recently, Russell described the word alternative as "unfortunate" because it suggests only 1R (Russell, 2005 (Shuster, 1997 (Shuster, , p. 1436 (DFG, 2016, p. 43) .
In Nozick ( 1974 , p. 39) put it. Cohen (1986 ( Croce, 2000; Gericke and Re inke, 2011; cf. Pappworth, 1968) . For Lafollette and Shanks (1996) and Greek and Greek (2003) (Lafollette and Shanks, 1996) . (Pound et al., 2004 (Akhtar, 2015; Knight, 2011) . This demonstrates the need for a retrospective evaluation and critical appraisal of the benefits of animal experiments to facilitate a para digm shift towards non-animal and human-relevant approaches.
the idea of the unavoidability of animal experiments is misleadingly taken as the "gold standard" within the scientific community. At the center of this critique is the deconstruction of the claim that animal experiments in biomedicine are pre dictive of human conditions. Lafollette and Shanks (2004; 2006) provide a cri tique of the use of animal models based on evolutionary theory. They observe that phylogenetically related animals have different mechanisms to achieve the same biological functions, a phenomenon they call "causal-functional asymmetry". This phenomenon renders cross-species extrapolations as causal explanations impossible. Knowledge of relevant causal differences, i.e., causal dis-analogies (with respect to mechanisms and pathw ay s), which compro mise the usefulness of analogical reasoning, is necessary; however, this knowl edge is only possible retrospectively, once a property has already been tested on different species. Lafollette and Shanks (1996) argue that the defense of animal experimentation relies on a scientifically misleading interpretation of the epistemic role of animal models in biomedical research. They explain that this defense is a product of Claude Bernard's legacy, which is based on a hypothetical-deductivist method in biomedicine, coupled with a rejection of statistical laws. Bernard assumed that clinical medicine (including epide miological studies) could never be a genuine science and believed in the in terchangeability of species to test clinical h yp otheses

The argument defending the unavoidability of animal experiments is based on the confusion between what are known as causal-analogic models (cAMs) and hypothetical animal models (HAMs
The Ethical Critique of Animal Experiments
The (Maehle, 1990 (Regan, 2004, p. 174) . Donaldson and Kymlicka, 2011 
The ethical critique attacks the cost-benefits of the animal model in two ways: first, the thesis of inviolable animal rights (right to life and prohibition of the infliction of suffering) intrinsically excludes the institutionalization of a cost-benefit calculation (see
